The American effort to expand the liberal international order, which structured post-World War II relations in the West, to the entire world after the end of the Cold War has ended in failure. That order, based on liberal principles and ostensibly on the rule of law, was ultimately dependent on American power, that is, America’s willingness to use force, and ability to use it effectively, to enforce the rules anywhere on the planet. There may have been a brief period, the so-called unipolar moment in the 1990s and early 2000s, when the United States came close to making that order truly universal, but that moment faded away as China rose and Russia reasserted itself on the global stage. The pandemic has only underscored America’s retreat from global leadership and lack of sufficient power to enforce the liberal rule of law. That order might continue to operate regionally, within the Transatlantic community, for example, although Trump’s disdain for America’s European allies has eroded even that. Worldwide, however, there is no one dominant, universal world order. American, Chinese, and Russian concepts compete for adherents. In many places, there is only growing disorder.
This all started after 9/11
This all started after 9/11
This all started after 9/11
The American effort to expand the liberal international order, which structured post-World War II relations in the West, to the entire world after the end of the Cold War has ended in failure. That order, based on liberal principles and ostensibly on the rule of law, was ultimately dependent on American power, that is, America’s willingness to use force, and ability to use it effectively, to enforce the rules anywhere on the planet. There may have been a brief period, the so-called unipolar moment in the 1990s and early 2000s, when the United States came close to making that order truly universal, but that moment faded away as China rose and Russia reasserted itself on the global stage. The pandemic has only underscored America’s retreat from global leadership and lack of sufficient power to enforce the liberal rule of law. That order might continue to operate regionally, within the Transatlantic community, for example, although Trump’s disdain for America’s European allies has eroded even that. Worldwide, however, there is no one dominant, universal world order. American, Chinese, and Russian concepts compete for adherents. In many places, there is only growing disorder.